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THE CHANGING LEGITIMACY OF DECOLONIZATION1 
Following the scramble for Africa in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, the imperial powers retained their grandeur until the close of the 
First World War. Based upon the outcome of that war, only that portion 
of sub-Saharan Africa under German control was unscrambled and plac-
ed under new management. The novel colonial dispensation, which af-
fected South West Africa (now Namibia), was international in name but 
national in implementation. Inaugurated as an institutional mechanism 
to camouflage the territorial ambitions of some of the Allied and 
Associated Powers, the League of Nations mandates system represented 
no radical threat to imperial values. Rather, it provided international 
cooperation in, and legitimacy for, the continuation of colonial rule. In-
deed, no African mandated territory received independence during the 
interwar period. 
Although reproached by the supervisory Permanent Mandates 
Commission in Geneva for suppressing a small-scale revolt by one 
branch of the Nama people living in the southern portion of the man-
dated territory of the South West Africa and for blatant favoritism 
toward the resident white community in the territory, the Union of South 
Africa was not threatened as a mandatory power by the eurocentric 
League of Nations.2 The Union was surrounded by British-ruled or 
Portuguese-ruled territories where African needs and desires were subor-
dinated either to grand imperial designs or to white sensitivities. Despite 
being thwarted by the League in its aspiration to acquire German South 
West Africa, the Union Government still sought to acquire neighboring 
Southern Rhodesia and the British High Commission Territories of 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. 
Even after the white electorate in Southern Rhodesia opted for self-
government rather than annexation by South Africa in 1922, the Union 
Government persisted in negotiating with the British authorities for the 
transfer of the contiguous three High Commission Territories.3 These 
territories were not under League supervision, yet the attentive British 
public was aware of the incorporation issue which protected Africans 
within the territories from further land alienation and from the creation 
of a modern economic infrastructure catering primarily to white com-
mercial interests. 
The Africans in Bechuanaland, for instance, were provided with ad-
visory councils, as were the members of the resident white community." 
In neighboring South West Africa, the Africans had little opportunity 
for symbolic participation in governance; the South African (and, for a 
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while, German) white residents were granted a measure of political 
autonomy even though they had no representation in the Union Parlia-
ment.5 
Following the Second World War, the international environment 
changed dramatically. The League of Nations was no more. After 1945 
two major structural changes occurred which had a profound impact 
upon politics in Southern Africa. First, the United Nations Organization 
fashioned at San Francisco provided much greater institutional support 
for the scrutiny of imperial business. In particular, colonial domains 
once off-limits in the League era were subject to international publicity, 
if not supervision, through the arrangement of providing data about 
non-self-governing territories. These were the residues of empire left 
after almost all the mandated territories were transformed into trust ter-
ritories. The supervisory 'back door' for non-self-governing territories 
was much larger and potentially more important than the international 
'front door' for the trust territories, and the back door was watched by 
the General Assembly. Second, the United Nations General Assembly 
became enlarged primarily as a result of the fragmentation of empire. 
Most of its new members were ex-colonials who used international 
machinery to terminate Western imperial rule. This was not the case with 
the League of Nations, whose members and structures were used to 
legitimize, and even improve, the administrative quality of colonial rule.6 
Prime Minister Smuts headed the South African delegation to the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1946. He sought international ap-
proval for the incorporation of the mandated territory of South West 
Africa by the Union instead of its conversion into a United Nations trust 
territory. In part, his case was based on the principle of self-determination, 
for he asserted that both the white and African residents of South West 
Africa had expressed themselves in favor of such an annexation. Only the 
British delegation supported the South African case, perhaps out of 
gratitude for the Union's contribution to the Allied cause in World War 
II.7 After the 1948 General Election in the Union, which marked the final 
triumph of Afrikaner nationalism, Prime Minister Malan's government 
persisted in pursuing the issue of the transfer of the British High Commis-
sion Territories, and became more hostile toward the United Nations 
General Assembly regarding the administration of South West Africa. 
From the watershed 1948 election until the independence of Ghana in 
1957, the government of South Africa solidified Afrikaner rule, rationaliz-
ed the theory and practice of white supremacy under the label of 
separateness, and fended off United Nations attacks on its domestic 
policies. In addition, it strengthened the economy of neighboring South 
West Africa, facilitated the rapprochement between the South African and 
German segments of the territorial white group,8 and linked the white 
residents there to the Union Parliament. South West Africa became a Na-
tional Party fiefdom, and recolonization, rather than decolonization, 
characterized Pretoria's policy planning for the territory. 
In neighboring Angola, there was no thought of retreat from em-
pire, all the more so because metropolitan Portugal was not admitted to 
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the United Nations until 1955. Its leaders' fascination with Lusop-
tropicalism represented a reaffirmation of the self-assigned imperial role 
for this small Iberian power. Great Britain, however, did begin to ad-
dress the issue of decolonization, dramatized by the accession of India 
and Pakistan to independence in 1947. The British task was facilitated by 
the Labor Party which had an anti-imperial tradition dating back to the 
beginning of the century. Such credentials did not prevent it from play-
ing punitive politics with the future president of Botswana, Seretse 
Khama, who married across the color bar and thus offended white 
mores, both in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa. The Khama af-
fair, although it detracted from the British reputation, sensitized the 
British to the burdens of empire and to the dangers of white paramount-
cy, which were visible in both Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, as well as 
in South Africa.' 
African nationalism was heavily suppressed by the Portuguese, who 
professed to practice an enlightened policy of non-racialism based on the 
assimilation of selected Africans by the colonial society. Yet revolt 
erupted in Angola in 1961, shortly after Zaire (then the Congo) was 
precipitously granted independence by Belgium. Such a transition 
frightened members of the white electorate in South Africa, who took a 
dim view of the decolonization process.10 This process was legitimized by 
the United Nations General Assembly, the majority of whose members 
passed a noted resolution in 1960, termed the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, unreservedly 
favoring independence. In the early 1960s the General Assembly Special 
Committee of Twenty Four (known formally as the "Special Committee 
on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples") 
dealt with the decolonization process in Bechuanaland" while the Inter-
national Court of Justice at The Hague was considering the Ethiopian 
and Liberian suit aimed at prying South West Africa loose from the con-
trol of Pretoria. 
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
Notwithstanding the charge that considerable resources and energy 
were frittered away in judicial attempts to induce South Africa to mend 
its political ways in South West Africa,12 consulting the International 
Court of Justice rule on the international status of the League mandated 
territory was not a tactical mistake from the Western perspective. 
African decision-makers were quick to realize that the Western industrial 
power, and not the Soviet bloc members, had the requisite trade and in-
vestment linkages to use as leverage against South Africa. Moreover, 
these Western powers had three (four, until the admission of the People's 
Republic of China) of the five permanent seats on the United Nations 
Security Council, which was the only organ in the United Nations 
authorized to apply meaningful coercive measures against member and 
non-member states under the provisions of the Charter. The South 
African government was equally attentive to the unequal allocation of 
power within in the United Nations system. 
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Ever since the Smuts government was rebuffed by the United Na-
tions in its efforts to add South West Africa to the Union in an interna-
tionally recognized manner in 1946, subsequent South African govern-
ments have attempted to resolve matters with an increasingly hostile 
United Nations by negotiating with one or more of the Western powers. 
The South African rationale for this originally was the League mandate, 
awarded to the Union in 1920 by the Allied and Associated Powers 
which, among others, included France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Two of the three had colonial possessions in Africa, while 
the third (the United States) was a military and economic superpower 
with growing investments in South Africa. South Africa initially made 
no mention of either Japan (which was one of the Allied and Associated 
Powers as well as a mandatory power) or of West Germany (which had a 
number of nationals in the territory), possibly because neither state 
belonged to the United Nations. 
From 1950 until 1966 the International Court of Justice dealt on 
four separate occasions (1950,1955,1956, and 1962-1966) with the status 
of the territory, the rules to be observed in scrutinizing the South African 
administration of the territory, and the quality of the South African 
stewardship as mandatory power in the absence of a mandates system. 
The first three times, the Court delivered an advisory opinion, but in the 
fourth instance, it dealt with a contentious case (with Ethiopia and 
Liberia as joint plaintiffs and South Africa as the defendant) and 
dismissed the case on a technicality in July 1966. Hence, international 
jurisprudence provided no binding judgements which the Security Coun-
cil could enforce against South Africa. This enraged most African 
member states of the General Assembly while delighting the Verwoerd 
government in Pretoria. A month after the Court delivered its judge-
ment, the African nationalists began guerrilla warfare in Namibia, and 
this was quickly followed by the granting of independence to Botswana 
and Lesotho in September and October 1966, respectively. A year earlier, 
Botswana's eastern neighbor, Southern Rhodesia, declared itself in-
dependent of the British Crown. At this time Angola and Mozambique 
were both in the midst of a guerrilla warfare aimed at wresting in-
dependence from Portugal. 
With the onset of low-intensity guerrilla warfare in Namibia, 
multilateral diplomacy became even more significant. This type of war-
fare is, par excellence, political warfare. The Organization of African 
Unity, the United Nations, and the Commonwealth of Nations served as 
organizational platforms for inter-African diplomacy and for exerting 
African pressure on metropolitan powers. Later, two constellations of 
states emerged which attempted to facilitate the independence process 
for Zimbabwe13 and for Namibia: the Front Line States (which began in 
1976 and was originally composed of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Zambia) and the Western Contact Group (which began in 
1977 and consisted of Canada, France, West Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). The division of labor between the two 
clusters permitted the Front Line States to deal with the African na-
tionalist groups in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the Contact Group to act 
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as an extension of the Security Council in facilitating minimal contact 
and bargaining between Pretoria and its African nationalist protagonists 
in Namibia or in exile.14 
INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND 
NEIGHBORING STATES 
Encouraged by the visible success of African nationalist movements 
in colonial territories further north, African nationalists in South Africa 
challenged the Pretoria regime for the sharing, if not the transfer, of 
power. The governmental response was the repression of African dissent, 
on the one hand, and the cultivation of African subnationalism and the 
promotion of ethnic homelands, on the other. African nationalist 
organizations, such as the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan 
Africanist Congress, were either outlawed or counterbalanced by ethnic 
particularism. Those deeply committed to eventual African majority rule 
were often able to exit South Africa illegally through the High Commis-
sion Territories in the early 1960s. 
Bechuanaland (and thereafter Botswana) became a main conduit 
northward for South African, as well as Namibian, refugees bent on 
political life in exile and perhaps on returning as trained insurgents. 
Because of Botswana's proximity to battlegrounds in neighboring South 
Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, refugees became a permanent feature 
of the political landscape.15 The refugee influx was a catalyst in the frui-
tion of African nationalism in Botswana, which moved from self-
governing status in March 1965 to full independence in September 1966. 
Insurgencies in neighboring countries adversely affected Botswana's 
domestic tranquility, yet Botswana waited eleven years (1966-1977) 
before creating its own armed forces in response to repeated cross-border 
operations by the Southern Rhodesian security forces. Very few, if any 
other, African states have begun their independence without an army. 
Botswana managed the initial years of independence with only a police 
force, which had an effective paramilitary unit to handle security 
threats.'6 
At the time of independence, Botswana was flanked on the east and 
west by white-ruled neighbors whose regimes were under attack by 
African nationalist forces. Because Botswana had a heavy population 
density along the railway line linking South Africa with Southern 
Rhodesia and because the economic, transportation, and communica-
tions grid bound Botswana tightly to South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia, the insurgency in Southern Rhodesia was a more immediate 
threat to the decision-makers in Gaborone." In South West Africa, the 
South African government initiated its counterinsurgency program by 
building an elaborate legal system designed to hobble any conceivable 
type of resistance to the prevailing order and to restrict its response to the 
Police Force. This was all that was needed, from Pretoria's perspective, 
at this time" when the government was busy imposing its vision of 
separate development upon the Africans of the territory. South Africa 
would counter the symbols and rhetoric of African nationalism with 
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bread-and-butter subnationalism which would hold economic attractions 
for traditional elites, particularly in Ovamboland, an African reserve in 
the north bordering on Angola. Until the displacement of the Caetano 
Government by a coup in 1974, the South Africans were able to rely 
upon the Portuguese armed forces to make Angola inhospitable to 
members of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). 
Over time, the conduct of the SWAPO insurgency, undertaken 
through its military component, the People's Liberation Army (PLAN) 
was increasingly conducted from rear area bases in Zambia as well as in 
Angola. Unlike the situation in Mozambique, PLAN has yet to be able to 
secure staging and control areas within Namibia itself." With the 
cooperation of Zambia, PLAN was able to extend its operations east of 
Ovamboland into the Kaokoveld and Caprivi Strip areas by 1973. The 
previous year, 1972, the South African Defense Force (SADF) moved in-
to Namibia to take charge of the war against PLAN, and the costs have 
escalated from R90 million in 1972 to R650 million in 1981." 
By 1980, the war was being fought on a national, local, and ethnic 
basis with support from SADF units, from a newly-raised South West 
Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), and from black units recruited in 
both places. For a long time, South African military and political tradi-
tions forbade the recruitment and deployment of Africans in combat 
roles. The manpower requirements on the border were such that military 
innovations were needed.21 One regional consequence of the shift in 
recruitment policies involved the use of Basarwa (Bushmen) as trackers 
in the SADF. These aboriginal people live in both Namibia and 
Botswana, and concern has been expressed by anthropologists regarding 
the 'modernization' of the Bushmen in such a military manner. 
Botswana has now passed legislation proscribing the recruitment of 
military personnel within its borders for any army except the Botswana 
Defense Force (BDF)." 
As in counterinsurgency operations elsewhere, the SADF devotes at-
tention to civic action programs among the African inhabitants of the 
operational zones, hoping to weaken the inhabitants' links to SWAPO 
which is unable to deliver such services except in its rear zones in 
Angola." The Namibian guerrilla war, which has lasted two decades, has 
had a substantial impact upon the local inhabitants and upon the South 
Africans in the métropole.24 Not only has Namibia become, effectively, a 
preserve of the SADF but also it has contributed to the SADF vision of 
the proper societal response to what is viewed as a "total onslaught" 
against the South African way of life. Heretofore, the SADF had been a 
secondary, subservient force in the South African body politic, but the 
ongoing guerrilla warfare in Namibia, where most officers serve a tour of 
duty, has heightened the political consciousness and attentiveness of the 
SADF officer corps especially in the field of political ideology and 
revolutionary warfare.25 
Beginning with Operation Zulu in 1976, the SADF has launched at-
tacks from Namibian bases into southern Angola. Its first foray into 
Angola resulted in some bitterness toward the United States because 
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South African decision-makers thought that the Americans had given 
tacit approval of such a venture." Since President Agostinho Neto's 
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in 
Luanda played host both the PLAN and to Cuban troops," the South 
Africans rationalized their cross-broder operations as little more than 
forward defense and deployment to halt SWAPO infiltration into 
Namibia at its source. In addition, the Pretoria regime furnished aid and 
comfort to a dissident southern Angolan group, UNITA (National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola), led by Dr. Jonas 
Savimibi. 
South African military support was also given to support a dissident 
Mozambican group, RENAMO or MNR (Mozambique National 
Resistance Movement), which waged a low-intensity war against Presi-
dent Samora Machel's FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique) government in Maputo. This policy of encouraging ethnic 
fragmentation was South Africa's political specialty, for it was the 
bedrock of apartheid (and later separate development) and served to 
blunt African coalition building. On the more overt level, the SADF 
undertook punitive raids against Lesotho and Mozambique for harbor-
ing South African refugees whom South African authorities regarded as 
clear and present threats. 
Coupled with this projection of military and air power was a 
diplomatic offensive against African-ruled southern African states to en-
tice them to sign non-aggression pacts and thus freeze out ANC in-
surgents, denying them staging areas for attacks on South Africa.2' The 
process worked well in Mozambique and Swaziland, whose governments 
signed these pacts." Botswana resisted South African blandishments and 
later was raided by the SADF,30 while Lesotho responded to a South 
African blockade with a military coup, displacing the Jonathan Govern-
ment, which originally had been a pliant one from the South African 
perspective.31 
IMMOBILISME IN NAMIBIA 
The Namibian insurgency has continued for twenty years, while 
South African de facto control over the territory has lasted for forty 
years in this golden age of decolonization. This situation yields several 
questions. Why have the negotiations among the Contact Group, the 
Front Line States, and the two principals (South Africa and SWAPO) 
over the proposed independence of Namibia produced such meager 
results? What accounts for the temporizing? What outcomes are most 
likely?32 
In the first place, on the basis of 1984 public opinion surveys con-
ducted among the white electorate and white elite in South Africa, it ap-
pears that the climate of electoral opinion has grown more supportive of 
direct talks with SWAPO. On this particular issue, the electorate leads 
the bureaucratic and political elite. Nevertheless, there is a feeling that 
the war with PLAN could be won. On the one hand, there are signs that 
the burdens and costs of counterinsurgency are mounting and that talks 
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might lead to the termination of hostilities. Yet, on the other hand, there 
is no evidence of a lack of confidence in South Africa's martial 
abilities." Even though there have been instances of white South 
Africans evading conscription into the SADF, draft-dodging has yet to 
become a serious, debilitating problem.34 This suggests, then, that the 
political leadership could harness white public opinion to support direct 
talks with the SWAPO leadership regarding the cessation of hostilities, 
but it also means that public support for the twenty year-old war has not 
eroded. 
A second factor which is repeatedly mentioned in the literature on 
the conflict over Namibia is the need of the Pretoria Government to pro-
tect its electoral flank from the ultra-conservatives. It is argued that this 
group would be able to capitalize upon the loss of Namibia by the white 
authorities. In addition, should the loss of Namibia mean the concomi-
tant exodus of Afrikaner voters from Namibia to South Africa, there is 
the anticipation that these displaced whites would punish the government 
for their loss by endorsing ultra-right South African political parties. The 
conclusion seems to be that the government in Pretoria would not will-
ingly be a party to its electoral defeat by disengaging from Namibia. 
Hence, there is a quest for politically palatable formulae and lines of 
retreat. The graceful exit is one of the keys to the solution of the pro-
blem.33 Yet it is equally important to recall that the German-speaking 
whites involved in commercial pursuits in the territory are thought to be 
less anxious about who controls the territory. They could make their 
peace with SWAPO provided that private entrepreneurs were welcome in 
the new nation." Hence, part of the solution to the problem lies in the 
development of minimal minority rights for those whites who choose not 
to emigrate, and this is a topic well-suited to diplomatic agreements made 
under the aegis of the Western Contact Group and the Front Line 
States.37 
The third element to consider in the resolution of the conflict is the 
interjection of Cold War issues by South Africa and the United States, 
primarily the presence of roughly 23,000 Cuban armed forces and 6,000 
Cuban civilians in Angola.3' The Cubans, in turn, receive some 
assistance from the East Germans and the Soviets, with the Soviets pro-
viding the weaponry and logistical support.39 This Eastern bloc support 
is used mainly to insure the political primacy of the MPLA government 
in Luanda, which had fought two other rivals — FNLA (National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA — for the Portuguese 
patrimony. Unlike the situation in Mozambique, where the Portuguese 
relinquished power to FRELIMO, in Angola, there was no one single 
African nationalist group which enjoyed supremacy on the battlefield 
and a monopoly of international recognition. Recently, Dr. Savimbi's 
UNITA has been attempting to force the MPLA to share power with it. 
UNITA has enjoyed South African backing and aspires to tap anti-
communist sentiments within the United States Congress to acquire even 
greater levels of aid in its battle against Luanda.40 At stake is "borrowed 
power," that is, power from outside the region used to tip the balance in 
favor of a disputant.41 
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Many American Africanist scholars are disturbed at the intrusion of 
East-West concerns into what they claim is a regional issue, seeing the at-
tempt to couple South African disengagement from Namibia with a sym-
metrical Cuban disengagement of forces from Angola as an unnecessari-
ly complicating factor.42 The issue is the essential weakness of the two 
neighboring regimes: that of South African-governed Namibia, with its 
clutch of internal political parties which have yet to generate the mass ap-
peal and legitimacy of SWAPO; and that of the MPLA regime in Luan-
da which is challenged by UNITA in the south, financed in large part by 
royalties from Gulf/ Chevron Oil operating in Cabinda, and supplied 
with military hardware by the Soviet Union. Neither side has undisputed 
legitimacy — SWAPO and UNITA have seen to that43 — and neither 
party can win on the battlefield and enforce a victor's peace on the 
other.44 
What, then, are the prospects in the near future? Will Namibia join 
Botswana as an independent state, probably as a member of the Com-
monwealth of Nations? Will the United States recognize the Angolan 
government? Will the combat continue or will there be commotion but 
no motion? It seems that the short-term outlook is bleak and could be 
characterized as immobilisme. To the extent that the Namibian impasse 
is characterized as a Cold War issue with concerns about "borrowed 
power" there is even less opportunity for conflict resolution.45 It is also 
most likely that the solution to the conflict rests with a sequential ap-
proach in which the MPLA-UNITA fragmentation is considered first, 
the Angolan state is consolidated and then the Namibian question is 
handled.46 Moreover, the South African regime has shown itself perfect-
ly capable of dilatory bargaining techniques,47 and the recent announce-
ment to the South African Parliament by President P.W. Botha that 
South Africa would begin to implement the relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolution on August 1, 1986 if the Cuban troop issue 
were resolved,4' provides little concrete evidence of change. 
In light of Dr. Savimbi's trek to Washington, D.C. and his apparent 
willingness to hold Gulf/Chevron Oil hostage by means of economic 
sabotage,4' it seems that the Cuban forces will be all the more necessary 
for the dos Santos regime. That government, in turn, is hardly likely to 
reward the Botha regime with a diplomatic settlement as a result of the 
deliberate undercutting of its own domestic base of power. Commen-
tators have noted the insensitivity of American mediators in the Nami-
bian issue regarding fundamental security concerns in Luanda.50 In addi-
tion, the Americans may have, in their fixation upon "borrowed 
power," fallen prey to the maxim of the American liberal tradition that 
"distributing power is more important than accumulating power." This 
maxim runs counter to patterns of political development in Third World 
states.51 It could be argued that political survival is a pressing concern for 
the Angolan government elite, just as it is for the elite in Pretoria. The 
smoldering discontent of African urban youth in South Africa and the 
rising death toll even after the lifting of the state of emergency are areas 
of far greater concern to Pretoria, which has to cope not only with a 
weakened economy but also with declining sources of revenue in 
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Namibia. SWAPO's political inheritance is now diminished by falling 
commodity prices for Namibia's principal exports, thus making the ter-
ritory less of an economic prize than when the insurgency began in 
1966." 
The lack of a buoyant economy, the threat of escalating economic 
sanctions from the West, and anxiety about the extreme right-wing of 
Afrikanerdom, which is transfixed by the loss of white privilege, give 
Pretoria little reason to accept an increasing debt burden (from the loss 
of Namibia) in a time of penury. Political solutions are easier to sustain 
when there is the lubricant of affluence, and thus it seems that im-
mobilisme rather than conflict resolution is the less expensive option at 
present. As Professor Zartman correctly observed, "... low-level conflict 
is preferable to possible political compromise for SWAPO and for South 
Africa as well, which is why the war goes on."53 To expect otherwise in 
an ideologically supercharged and economically bearish environment 
would be myopic. 
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